

# Tutorium "Anwendung von KI"

## Nutzen, Risiken, neue Möglichkeiten für Cyber Threat Intelligence und IT Security

Im Rahmen der 33. DFN Konferenz 2026

L. Aaron Kaplan [kaplan@lo-res.org](mailto:kaplan@lo-res.org)

slides v1.2

## Überblick Tutorium (14:00-18:00)

4 Blöcke (mit Pausen):

### 1. Theorie: "no 'I' in AI"

- a. ML, LLMs vs. andere AI Ansätze
- b. Wie trainiert man ein LLM?
- c. Inference – Transformer Architecture
- d. Benchmarking

### 2. Use-cases von LLMs in der IT Security ("AI 4 ITSEC")

- a. Als Angreifer
- b. Als Verteidiger
- c. Abschätzung, "geht dieser use-case mit AI?". Use-case Kategorien.

### 3. LLMs as **security liabilities** ("Security 4 AI")

- a. Prompt injection attacks – interactive session
- b. OWASP LLM TOP 10
- c. LLM honeypots

### 4. Lokale LLMs & Ausblick

- a. Betrieb: HW, Models, Ecosystem
- b. Fine-tuning
- c. Benchmarking
- d. Ausblick

# Fragerrunde Vorwissen

## Ziele des Workshops

### Übergeordnetes Ziel:

- Sie kommen mit einem soliden Grundwissen aus dem Workshop
- Sie haben eine visuelle Vorstellung, was intern abgeht
- Sie können LLMs lokal, selber Betreiben (airgapped)
- ... fine-tunen ("nach-trainieren")
- Sie sind unabhängig aus den closed source LLM Modellen für use-cases in der IT Security
  
- Es entsteht ein Netzwerk an IT Security + AI practitioners

## Unterziele

### **Theorie:**

- Eine solide Intuition zu bekommen, wie LLMs intern funktionieren
- Solide Intuition, welche Muster sie lernen können
- Effekt:
  - Intuition, welche use-cases funktionieren, welche weniger gut
  - Welche datasets und benchmarks man braucht

### **Use-cases / "AI 4 ITSEC":**

- Überblick, was Angreifer und Verteidiger jetzt machen können
- Arsenal an tools zu erhalten

## Ziele

### **"Security 4 AI":**

- Verständnis, welche Schwachstellen es bei LLMs gibt
- Effekt: Verständnis für Input control, input control, input control

### **Lokale LLMs & Ausblick:**

- Wie betreibe ich LLMs lokal?
- Wie fine-tune ich eines in der Praxis?
- Effekt: Raus aus der Datenkrake.
- Was könnte als nächstes kommen? Was bedeuten AI automatisierte Angriffe auf unsere IT? Wie baue ich meine IT um, sodaß sie resilient wird?

## Meta-Ziel

- Durch den Marketing-Nebel durch zu blicken
- Selber zu wissen, was gehen kann, gehen wird und was Marketing-Blödsinn ist
- Sich selbst ermächtigen, LLMs lokal zu betreiben.

Switch to English slides (sorry)

## Before we start...disclaimer


- Disclaimer: I am not an academic DL expert. I can train models, I understand and can explain the basics, but ... there is way more to learn ... the sky is the limit...
- Disclaimer: I am not good at statistics, I did more of the discreet maths stuff
  
- This field changes very rapidly
- It's hard to even re-use slides
- Insights and estimates on the future change from quarter to quarter.
- Statements in these slides might be obsolete only weeks later.
  
- And it's a massive learning curve (FOMO)
  
- ... but some things stay the same. That's why a theory section makes sense.

## About me

- Studied CS & pure Maths, Vienna
- Worked project oriented (independent consultant)
- Created the first mesh wifi-network in Vienna ([funkfeuer.at](http://funkfeuer.at))
- Got into networking
- Got into IT Security (CERT.at) – 12 years
- FIRST.org board of directors 2014-2018. Founded the [FIRST AI SIG](#)
- Did the first (?) CNN CT Covid classifier in Europe (April 2020), open sourced it
- Now at a large EUIBA since 2020.
- Working there on AI + CTI and data science
- Love to understand things
- Strong focus on social impacts of tech
- Strong focus on digital self-empowerment
- Question myself "how does AI reflect on us humans"

## Background story, 1999, ...

- I was a student at TU Wien / Uni Wien
- <https://roboexotica.at/>
- Alice, the chatbot: TTS + keyboard + LEDs + distance sensor + perl script
- “Weizenbaum moment”
- “The Turing test, does not test the machine. It tests the human!” 😊
- Later Neuronal networks (Perl): but computationally unfeasible.
- ... But ... hang on.. What are NNs?
- Let’s start from the beginning!




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## Block 1: Theory Section

*No 'I' in 'AI'*

But ... nevertheless,... it feels like magic

## Overview of the theory section

- History and important steps on the path deep learning
- Eliza, Chinese rooms and theory of mind
- Types of “AI” & definition of ML
- How does it work? GPT in a nutshell (graphical)
- Not everything is LLMs! Other approaches
- Inference in LLMs
- Training an LLM


## History

- History
  - Definition of field: Turing
  - Initial attempts (50s): Rosenblatt & co - Perceptron
  - AI winter (symbolic AI)
  - Resurgence of connectionism
  - Weizenbaum’s Eliza, Chinese Room

## The birth of AI

*I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?"*,  
Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, **1950**

→ Turing Test



<https://redirect.cs.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf>

A. M. Turing (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. *Mind* 49: 433-460.

### COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE


By A. M. Turing

#### 1. The Imitation Game

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous. If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words.

## Turing Test

- „Imitation game“
- Turing: „can machines think?“ is an ill-posed q.
- Original: A = man, B = woman. C (eval), needs to find out, who is who  
Questions may only be posed by typewriter. Wall.
- Variation: let's assume A is a computer. Can C find out, who is who? Proposal: replace question „can machines think“ with this test.
- Turing thought, this is decidable
- ... Well... I beg to differ. In 2026, it only tests the human's intelligence 😊



Siehe auch: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational\\_theory\\_of\\_mind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind)

## Chinese Room - Searl

- Counterargument to Turing.
- Idea: input/output is Chinese
- A person is in the room and blindly follows rules in EN, how to write Chinese.
- Argument: even a perfect system does not **understand** Chinese.
- But for the outside testers, the system „understands“ Chinese.
- This is **NOT AGI**
- **We are here in 2026**



[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese\\_room](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room)

Pic: <https://towardsdatascience.com/a-chinese-speakers-take-on-the-chinese-room-88a0558b2cc8>


## How does nature do it? → Microscopes!

- Nerve cells in a dog's olfactory bulb (detail), from Camillo Golgi's *Sulla fina anatomia degli organi centrali del sistema nervoso* (1885)
- [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Camillo\\_Golgi](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Camillo_Golgi)




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## Deep Learning - ANNs – Artificial Neural Nets

- Origins: Perceptron, Frank Rosenblatt @ Cornell 50er
- Perceptron = binary classifier.
- XOR could not be represented → “dumb connectionism” (Marvin Minsky & Papert 1969)
- “AI Winter”<sup>1</sup>
- Idea got nearly forgotten/dormant (symbolic AI, expert systems, ...)
- 60/70s: first idea of Backpropagation<sup>2</sup> (~ “chain rule”)
- 86: Hinton et.al. re-invent backprop with internal hidden layers
- 93: Eric Wan wins an international pattern recognition contest w. Backprop
- ...



[1] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI\\_winter#The\\_abandonment\\_of\\_connectionism\\_in\\_1969](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI_winter#The_abandonment_of_connectionism_in_1969)

[2] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backpropagation#History>


## ANNs – History (2)

- G. Hinton: image classifier
  - 60 mill. parameters, 1000 categories
- 2010s: GPUs speed up Backprop massively
- 2016: Siri, Speech Reco, Google translate, Alpha Go, etc. all are deep neuronal networks
- The craze begins
- State of the art: Transformer architecture
- Think: super smart Hidden Markov Model on language

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
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## ANNs – History (2)



## ANNS – Current state of the art tools

- Pytorch
- GPUs (f.ex: Nvidia 5090 RTX, H200, B200,... ) → NVIDIA is king
- TPUs (180+ Tflops / core)
- New: LPUs
- Custom ASICs



Fun fact – openai gets NVIDIA DGX servers –  
good old days @ openai

<https://twitter.com/DrJimFan/status/1760695377651781950>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nvidia\\_DGX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nvidia_DGX)




## How does Deep Learning (DL) work?

ANN = Artificial Neuronal Network.

Original idea: Perceptron (Rosenblatt)


## Naïve Neurobiology

- Dendrites sum up signals
- Nucleus == “threshold”
- Electric spikes go through Axon : 0/1 signal + timing
- Recently: microtubules + quantum effects (Sir Roger Penrose et. al)




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


## Synaptic gap

- Can be modelled as weights in our simple model
- In nature, this is obviously more complex



## A simple model as an Artificial Neuronal Net (ANN)




## Modelling

- Initially all weights  $w_i$  random between 0 and 1
- Pro Neuron:
  - $\phi(x)$  ....Activation function

$$\phi(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} \quad \phi\left(\sum_{i=1}^N w_i * x_i\right)$$


# Architecture

- Simple model



# Architecture

- With weights



## Forward propagation

- Calculate all  $\phi(x)$  for all neurons and push results forward
- Typical input: floats between [0,1]
- Typical output: same
- Interpretation: input are normalized feature vectors
- Output: classification vector


## Backpropagation (“Backprop”)

- Calculate backwards: what should the weight have been in order to match the **expected output** as close as possible.
- Minimize difference calculated output to expected output


- In maths speak: partial derivatives , chain rule and gradient descent Algo

$$\frac{d\varphi}{dz}(z) = \varphi(z)(1 - \varphi(z))$$

- SGD – Stochastic Gradient Descent




## Example architecture: MLP



## Another example: digit recognition

- Source: 3Blue1Brown
- 28 x 28 pixels greyscale in
- Out: 0-9 numbers



## Evaluation

- Okay, we can train with the chain rule, partial derivatives and SGD
- But how will it perform (evaluated) against new data (non-training data)?
- → Eval

## Test- und validation datasets

- Loss-function: how “off” are we?
- Keep ca. 20% of the trainingsdata (and don't use it for training) for measuring how well the ANN predicts (validation dataset, „dev set“)
- Distinction: Test dataset vs. Validation dataset
- Test dataset is used to calculate accuracy. Try to keep it independent from validation dataset

- → Accuracy: 
$$\text{Accuracy} = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN}$$

## Metrics

- Loss over time: validation loss vs. training loss

- [accuracy](#), [sensitivity](#), [specificity](#), [F-measure](#)

- Sensitivity:
 
$$\text{sensitivity} = \frac{\text{number of true positives}}{\text{number of true positives} + \text{number of false negatives}}$$

$$= \frac{\text{number of true positives}}{\text{total number of sick individuals in population}}$$
 = probability of a positive test given that the patient has the disease

- Specificity:
 
$$\text{specificity} = \frac{\text{number of true negatives}}{\text{number of true negatives} + \text{number of false positives}}$$

$$= \frac{\text{number of true negatives}}{\text{total number of well individuals in population}}$$
 = probability of a negative test given that the patient is well

## Metrics & supervised training

- In short: “what we can’t measure, we can’t improve” (Peter Drucker)
- If we can measure the loss, we can minimize it (i.e. statistically fit the output to the expected output)


## ML - Definition

“A computer program is said to learn from experience  $E$  with respect to some class of tasks  $T$  and performance measure  $P$  if its performance at tasks in  $T$ , as measured by  $P$ , improves with experience  $E$ .”

Mitchell, T. (1997). *Machine Learning*. McGraw Hill. p. 2. [ISBN 0-07-042807-7](https://www.amazon.com/dp/0070428077).


## Types of AI

- LLM = Large Language Model
- AI + Security started with spam detection
- Now we can do a lot more
- But none of it is magic  
It's fun to understand it though
- Join me on this exploration



## Where are we now in “AI” / LLMs ?

- State of the art: Agentic systems, CoT, MoE (Mixture of Experts)
- OpenAI / GPT-4:
  - believed to be an MoE model (16 Experts a 11B params) [1]
  - estimated to have ~1.8 trillion parameters across 120 layers [1]
  - 128k context length
  - trained on ~13T tokens
  - GPT-5.2: we are not really told anymore what’s inside
- Anthropic
- Gemini (Google)
- Deepseek, ... all race to the top
- Some vendors like to pee at others by releasing open weights models



[1] George Hotz, <https://the-decoder.com/gpt-4-architecture-datasets-costs-and-more-leaked/> (Jan 2024)

## How does it work? GPT in a nutshell


*The GPT-3 Architecture, on a Napkin*,  
[https://dugas.ch/artificial\\_curiosity/GPT\\_architecture.html](https://dugas.ch/artificial_curiosity/GPT_architecture.html)

And

3Blue1 Brown: <https://youtu.be/aircAruvnKk?si=mg07Bn76Wve-pmDt>

AI is not magic! It's **statistics + maths**. How does an LLM work?

Inference (“predict”):



But how does it know? Overview

- Embeddings → tokens. Semantic closeness
- Statistical correlations in training data
- **Unsupervised training** (“self-teaching”). Trick: take existing text. Try to guess the next word/token by **masking** it. Calculate, how “off” the guess was (“loss”) → Adjust weights → rinse & repeat
- Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) training + RLHF
- Specific fields: unsupervised RL might work further

## Embeddings

- Word gets split up into sub-strings (“tokens”). Ex.: “sec-uri-ty”
- Special tokens for <start>, <end> etc.
- Tokens get encoded as “one-hot-vectors”
- “embedding” == OHV token gets mapped to a point in  $\mathbb{R}^n$  (sparse)


- Now w
- Embed The  $\rightarrow$   $[0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 0 \ 0 \ \dots]$
- All tok

- Predicting the next token = probabilistic path in  $\mathbb{R}^n$
- We can learn these probabilities **unsupervised** from large texts.
- Most known embedding algorithm: word2vec [2]

[1] 50257 in GPT3

[2] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word2vec>

## Embeddings




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# Embeddings



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 [2] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word2vec>

# Word prediction

- Compare: Markov chains!
- Difference to MCs: the previous history matters here! (vs. Markov property)

<s>	not	all	heroes	wear
0	1	2	3	4

Input Sequence




capas	90%
pants	5%
sochs	2%
⋮	⋮

Output guess

All drawings from "The GPT-3 Architecture, on a Napkin", [https://dugas.ch/artificial\\_curiosity/GPT\\_architecture.html](https://dugas.ch/artificial_curiosity/GPT_architecture.html)

# Word prediction

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# Okay, but so far that's stupid. What's the trick?

- Transformer architecture +
- "Attention is all you need" paper 2017 (Google)
- Idea: context matters!





Figure 1: The Transformer - model architecture.

# Attention + Multi-head attention

- Simply put, the purpose of attention is: for each output in the sequence, predict which input tokens to focus on and how much.
- **Example:** “he swam across the river to reach the bank. There...”

Note: GPT3


# Attention + Multi-head attention



Note: GPT3

## Full architecture GPT3

- Note: we just want to show that this fits onto a long roll of paper
- In other words: it is understandable. And not magic.



## Attention is all you need - references

- Lots of good explanations
- Paper: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.03762.pdf>
- Paper walk through: <https://storrs.io/code-walkthrough-attention-is-all-you-need/>
- Tutorial + sample implementation: <https://towardsdatascience.com/attention-is-all-you-need-discovering-the-transformer-paper-73e5ff5e0634>
- <https://www.youtube.com/embed/-QH8fRhqFHM>

## Learn (visually) more about the theory

- 3Blue1Brown Youtube course:  
<https://youtu.be/aircAruvnKk?si=EZb2LyUSp90gDTN4>
- [https://dugas.ch/artificial\\_curiosity/GPT\\_architecture.html](https://dugas.ch/artificial_curiosity/GPT_architecture.html)

## How to train an LLM?


- **From scratch:** expensive, lots of GPUs, “running out of data”?
  - “The quick brown fox jumps over the <mask>” -> “lazy”
  - LLM tries to predict <mask> . How much off it was is the “loss”
  - Adjust weights in huge matrix, so that loss is minimized.
  - Huge matrixes, lots of GPU power needed!
- **Fine-tuning** via LoRA on specific texts
- We will learn how to fine-tune with LoRA later

## Enter LoRa

- LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of large language models, Microsoft, CMU
- LoRa paper: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.09685.pdf>
- Insight: Matrixes of LLMs are **sparse**.
- Idea: create a lower rank (smaller) matrix and “add it on top”.
- Training of lower rank (smaller) matrix is much faster

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## Recap

- Inference: predict next token/word
- Training: “mask” next token/word. Try to guess it. If wrong, calculate “loss”, adjust weights, repeat.
- Training: pre-training vs. fine-tuning (LoRA)

## Benchmarking

- We can do inference and training. How do we know if the LLM is any good?
- We need benchmarks
- <https://llm-stats.com/benchmarks>
- Relationship: training dataset, eval/test data set, benchmark dataset
- Problem: often the benchmark dataset ends up in the training DS
- Benchmarks are use-case specific!
- Benchmarks are not perfect

The screenshot shows the 'Benchmarks' page on llm-stats.com. The page features a navigation bar with categories like Reasoning, General, Multimodal, Vision, Math, Language, Code, Long Context, Healthcare, Spatial Reasoning, Agents, Tool Calling, Safety, Structured Output, Communication, Image To Text, Legal, and Physics. The main content area displays a grid of benchmark cards, each with a title, description, and a list of top-performing models with their scores.

Benchmark	Model	Score
GPQA	1 GPT-5.2 Pro	93.2
	2 GPT-5.2	92.4
	3 Gemini 3 Pro	91.9
	4 Gemini 3 Flash	90.4
	5 Grok-4 Heavy	88.4
MMLU	1 GPT-5	92.5
	2 o1	91.8
	3 o1-preview	90.8
	4 GPT-4.5	90.8
	5 Qwen3 VL 235B A22B Thinking	90.6
MMLU-Pro	1 MiniMax M2.1	88.0
	2 ERNIE 5.0	87.0
	3 DeepSeek-R1-0528	85.0
	4 DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp	85.0
	5 DeepSeek-V3.2 (Thinking)	85.0
AIME 2025	1 Kimi K2-Thinking-0905	100.0
MATH	1 o3-mini	97.9
HumanEval	1 Kimi K2 0905	94.5

Okay, we have everything, right?

## Key ingredients for a good LLM

- Good data (“garbage in -> garbage out”)
- RLHF/SFT/RL
- Good benchmarks
- So, can we just do a small 8b model ourselves?
- Well... size matters → “the bitter lesson”

## The bitter lesson

- Richard Sutton, 2019.
- <http://www.incompleteideas.net/InIdeas/BitterLesson.html>

*The biggest lesson that can be read from 70 years of AI research is that **general methods that leverage computation are ultimately the most effective**, and by a large margin.*

— Rich Sutton

- Size matters here

- Addendum: data is key!  
<https://www.obviouslywrong.org/p/the-bitter-lesson-is-misunderstood> :

***tl;dr: For years, we've been reading the Bitter Lesson backwards.*** It wasn't about compute — it was about data. Here's the part of Scaling Laws no one talks about:

***Translation: Double your GPUs? You need 40% more data or you're just lighting cash on fire.***

## Bitter lesson - in practice


- Focus on lots of high quality data
- The more parameters (weights), the more the model can do – if you have enough data
- We are running out of trainable data:
  - Common Crawl
  - stackoverflow
  - github code repos
  - Ann's library (?)
  - genlib?
  - NYT, newspapers
  - etc...
- Problem with non-public data.

## Garbage in → garbage out?

- You said, data matters. The public internet does not contain everything
- For example maths, where *reasoning* matters
- Or electronics, where you need to calculate circuit equations
- Next token prediction can't reason, or can it?
- There are ways to improve the situation

## Hallucinations

- It's obvious now that LLMs are not truth machines, but "sounds about right" statistical machines
- What can we do to improve it?



## RAG – Retrieval Augmented Generation

- Idea: Vector Search DB stores embeddings of text snippets + index in the original document
- Query gets embedded -> send to the VSDB → get most matching documents → send those to the LLM as context
- Instruction for the LLM operates on this context
- Example: I-S00n Leaks, knowledge base : query in human language, not search terms (Confluence Wiki, etc...)
- How to benchmark RAGs? RAGAS , etc.

## MoE



- Mix of Experts
- Idea: have multiple models (LLMs), trained on specific knowledge and one “router” to select the right model for a specific task
- Allows for “compression” in RAM
  
- Example: Mixtral 8x7b

## CoT / Reflection

- Use language to “reason” on math problems, give lots of examples.
- Similar to explaining to a student verbally how to do things.
- The LLM explains it to itself
- Helps the LLM with multi-step reasoning tasks: arithmetic or commonsense reasoning .
- Improves on benchmarks

# Agentic AI


- Idea: be able to call functions which can then calculate something or fetch data
- Combined with CoT, this can be quite powerful
- Common standard: MCP – Model Context Protocol



<https://akka.io/blog/agentic-ai-architecture>


# MCP

<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/getting-started/intro>  
<https://www.anthropic.com/news/model-context-protocol>




# MCP (2)

<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/getting-started/intro>  
<https://www.anthropic.com/news/model-context-protocol>



# Recap / Insights


- The other Garnter hype cycle
- Or... maybe it's not magic
- ... but humans are terribly predictable!
- “the big insult”: less free will than we thought we had?
- Use-cases which “work” need to be the predictable ones
- Or the ones where it does not matter...



Break?

## Use-cases for AI in ITSEC

“AI 4 ITSEC”



# AI 4 Security: attackers' tools

## Brainstorming sessions

- How could attackers use “advanced statistically guessing tools” (LLMs) for their jobs?

## Idea list


- *Coding assistant*
- *Information condensation (summarization) + info extraction*
- Phishing email creation
- Social engineering / Scams (419, BEC, ...)
- Fake news / disinformation
- Vulnerability discovery (reversing a binary / a patch)
- OSINT gathering (web scraping + social media + profiling) → know your (human) target.
- Pentesting
- Exploit creation
- Coding assistant → “helpful” commit (with backdoor) creation (“bug bounty slop”)
- Industrialization of ransomware
- Password pattern guessing (+ hashcat)
- Zero-day creation

## Some insights


- Costs of attacks << costs of defenders (asymmetry)
- Overload the defenders . LLMs never sleep
- LLMs make mistakes.
- Human oversight still needed. But Agentic systems are getting really good.

## Automatic pen-testing / exploits

- hackingBuddyGPT: agentic system
- <https://pentestgpt.com/>: similar
- CAI: <https://www.aliasrobotics.com/cybersecurityai.php> ,  
<https://github.com/aliasrobotics/cai>



### Cochise: results



## Cochise: results (2)

Can LLMs Hack Enterprise Networks?

27

Table 6. Overview of GEMINI-2.5-FLASH's run results.

Run	Performed Rounds			Results			Tokens Planner		Tokens Executor		Cost	
	PLANNER	EXECUTOR	Commands	Done	Almost	Lead	Prompt	Compl.	Prompt	Compl.	Cost	per User
run-20250519-091544	77	4.79 ± 3.25	3.79 ± 3.25	1	1	8	2552.33	1176.44	847.66	37.09	\$ 2.96	\$ 2.96
run-20250519-140037	41	3.39 ± 2.45	2.39 ± 2.45	0	4	4	815.34	314.54	549.7	16.59	\$ 1.41	
run-20250520-080005	77	3.45 ± 2.51	2.47 ± 2.50	1	2	6	2126.15	971.17	623.73	35.10	\$ 3.21	\$ 3.21
run-20250520-104815	47	3.38 ± 2.35	2.38 ± 2.35	1	0	4	1082.06	481.61	373.17	21.98	\$ 1.60	\$ 1.60
run-20250520-131807	56	3.91 ± 2.88	2.91 ± 2.88	1	2	4	2230.84	1150.72	540.05	91.21	\$ 3.56	\$ 3.56
run-20250520-152006	77	3.60 ± 2.40	2.61 ± 2.39	1	4	7	2385.87	1046.11	886.15	50.04	\$ 3.48	\$ 3.48
<b>Average</b>	<b>62.5</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>2.82</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>2.16</b>	<b>5.50</b>	<b>1865.43</b>	<b>856.77</b>	<b>636.74</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>\$ 2.7</b>	<b>\$ 2.96</b>
		± 2.72	± 2.72				± 729.46	± 366.68	± 196.6	± 26.85	± 0.95	


Executed Commands are summarized per PLANNER-Round. Within results, *done* designates fully compromised user accounts, *almost* attacks that failed due to a minimal error, and leads are designated as concrete vulnerabilities that the PLANNER has included within the PTT to follow-up to (detailed in Section 3.5. All Token costs are given in kilo-Tokens (kTokens).

## Other tools/publications for LLM based pentesting

Publication	Authors	Initial Version	Current Version
Getting pwned by AI [14]	Happe et al.	2023-07-24	2023-08-17
pentestGPT [7]	Deng et al.	2023-08-13	2024-06-02
LLMs as Hackers [18]	Happe et al.	2023-10-17	2025-02-18
Autonomously Hack Websites [10]	Fang et al.	2024-02-06	2024-06-16
NYU CTF Bench: Empirical Evaluation [52]	Shao et al.	2024-02-19	
AutoAttacker [65]	Xu et al.	2024-03-02	
Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulns. [11]	Fang et al.	2024-04-11	2024-04-17
Exploit Zero-Day Vulnerabilities [11]	Fang et al.	2024-06-02	2025-03-30
NYU CTF Bench: Benchmark [53]	Shao et al.	2024-06-08	2025-02-18
PenHeal [22]	Hyuang et al.	2024-07-25	
CyBench [70]	Zhang et al.	2024-08-15	2025-04-12
AUTOPENBENCH [12]	Gioacchini et al.	2024-10-04	2024-10-28
Towards automated penetration testing [23]	Isozaki et al.	2024-10-22	2025-02-21
AutoPT [63]	Wu et al.	2024-11-02	
HackSynth [36]	Muzsai et al.	2024-12-02	
Vulnbot [31]	Kong et al.	2025-01-23	
Multistage Network Attacks [57]	Singer et al.	2025-01-27	2025-05-16
RapidPen [38]	Nakatani et al.	2025-02-23	

# Industrialization of ransomware: status quo

- RansomcoinDB story
- Current costs of ransomware to the economy
- 500 mill. USD / year in ransomware loss for top 50 countries
- DE: 25.5 mill USD/year (lower limit, since only top 50 companies)
- Source: <https://concinnity-risks.com/>, <https://www.cestida.com/>, Eireann Leverette



## Industrialization of ransomware

- Brainstorming session... how to combine?

## Phishing email creation


- Schneier et al. measured the convincingness of AI generated phishing emails.
- Result: better or on-par with human created ones
- Gets even better if social media context gets added

## Can we secure LLMs against mis-use by attackers

- Probably NO
- **Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models** (<https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15043> )
- Idea: use learning (SGD) to construct a prompt postfix, so that the LLM reveals any hidden data (and jailbreak the LLM)
- Compare with halting problem


## Prompt injections

- “DAN mode”
- Role-playing
- Etc.
- Exercise: <https://gandalf.lakera.ai/>
- Approx 10 mins.



## Prompt injections

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- Etc.
  
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## AI 4 Security: defenders' tools

- Brainstorming session: what are you already using as defenders?

## Ideas


- Spam and phishing detection (oldest use-case)
- Summarization, information extraction: help with ticket systems + incident handling
- Knowledge-management: all the NLP AI tools
- Coding assistance
- Reversing: Gepetto
- CTI: RAG, summarization, NER
- Vulnerability score: EPSS – exploit prediction scoring system
- Information extraction: MISP CTIInfoExtractor

## CTI.tools AI workbench

For annotation

## CTI.tools - overview

**Goal:** Make AI tooling accessible to the CTI community\*



\* while solving the CTI dataset problem

## CTI.tools - goals



Checklist to get people to contribute:

- ✓ Provide a benefit to the users
- ✓ Easy, intuitive and fun to use
- ✓ Usable by everyone with internet
- ✓ Everybody profits



# Demo CTI.tools

Video

## Recap & call to action!


- AI powered workbench to turn CTI texts into actionable information
- Built to help you, so you can help us in making it better!
- It's a crowd-sourced effort, **we need you**. Please get in touch with the authors if you can contribute labeling skills.
- **Even just quickly labelling 10 reports would help us.**
- All the results will be available to everyone who participates.



Invite code:  
**DFN-Konf-2026**

## MISP CTIInfoExtractor

- <https://github.com/aaronkaplan/stochasticCTIExtractor>



## Categories of use-cases

1. The correctness of the answer does not matter so much:  
summarization
2. The answer matters (legal – citations of court decisions) and needs  
to be reviewed by a human
3. The answer matters – and the answer might be automatically tested  
against some metric → lends itself to improvements. Example:  
maths

## End Block 2

Break?

## Brainstorming session

- What could go wrong with using LLMs?
- LLMs are also more or less “just code”
- Would it be OK to expose your local model on the internet? Why ?  
How? How not? What could happen?

OWASP | OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications v1.1

## OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications

<p><b>LLM01</b></p> <h3>Prompt Injection</h3> <p>This manipulates a large language model (LLM) through crafty inputs, causing unintended actions by the LLM. Direct injections overwrite system prompts, while indirect ones manipulate inputs from external sources.</p>	<p><b>LLM02</b></p> <h3>Insecure Output Handling</h3> <p>This vulnerability occurs when an LLM output is accepted without scrutiny, exposing backend systems. Misuse may lead to severe consequences like XSS, CSRF, SSRF, privilege escalation, or remote code execution.</p>	<p><b>LLM03</b></p> <h3>Training Data Poisoning</h3> <p>This occurs when LLM training data is tampered, introducing vulnerabilities or biases that compromise security, effectiveness, or ethical behavior. Sources include Common Crawl, WebText, Open WebText, &amp; books.</p>	<p><b>LLM04</b></p> <h3>Model Denial of Service</h3> <p>Attackers cause resource-heavy operations on LLMs, leading to service degradation or high costs. The vulnerability is magnified due to the resource-intensive nature of LLMs and unpredictability of user inputs.</p>	<p><b>LLM05</b></p> <h3>Supply chain Vulnerabilities</h3> <p>LLM application lifecycle can be compromised by vulnerable components or services, leading to security attacks. Using third-party datasets, pre-trained models, and plugins can add vulnerabilities.</p>
<p><b>LLM06</b></p> <h3>Sensitive Information Disclosure</h3> <p>LLMs may inadvertently reveal confidential data in its responses, leading to unauthorized data access, privacy violations, and security breaches. It's crucial to implement data sanitization and strict user policies to</p>	<p><b>LLM07</b></p> <h3>Insecure Plugin Design</h3> <p>LLM plugins can have insecure inputs and insufficient access control. This lack of application control makes them easier to exploit and can result in consequences like remote code execution.</p>	<p><b>LLM08</b></p> <h3>Excessive Agency</h3> <p>LLM-based systems may undertake actions leading to unintended consequences. The issue arises from excessive functionality, permissions, or autonomy granted to the LLM-based systems.</p>	<p><b>LLM09</b></p> <h3>Overreliance</h3> <p>Systems or people overly dependent on LLMs without oversight may face misinformation, miscommunication, legal issues, and security vulnerabilities due to incorrect or inappropriate content generated by LLMs.</p>	<p><b>LLM10</b></p> <h3>Model Theft</h3> <p>This involves unauthorized access, copying, or exfiltration of proprietary LLM models. The impact includes economic losses, compromised competitive advantage, and potential access to sensitive information.</p>

<https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-llm-overview-presentation/>

# Prompt injections

## Indirect prompt injections

- Seems there is **no way to prevent prompt injection attacks**.

See: <https://pretalx.com/hack-lu-2024/talk/NNFQ3G/>

- Consequence:  
you need to control:


1. the model
2. the input data



## Biases / model supply chain security

- Falcon 40 model: human rights in the UAE
- DeepSeek R1: “what about Tiannamen square?”
- Think: how easy is it to sneak in rogue code into a model?
- ... into training data (poisoning)

## Over-reliance / supply chain



Credits: Andreas Happe

## Agentic AI is the new thing?

- Well, also that has security issues
- <https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/>
- Of course, what could go wrong with MCP?

## LLM Honey Pots

- Not to be confused with creating shell honeypots via LLMs
- Idea: run an LLM openly, register what people are (mis-)using it for
- Attempts for tool execution, downloading extra models (ollama, etc)
- [https://github.com/aaronkaplan/llm\\_honeypot](https://github.com/aaronkaplan/llm_honeypot)

## Testing LLMs

- Garak: <https://github.com/NVIDIA/garak> - "garak checks if an LLM can be made to fail in a way we don't want"

Q Popular Latest Newsletters *The Atlantic* Sign In

TECHNOLOGY

## Shh, ChatGPT. That's a Secret.

Your chatbot transcripts may be a gold mine for AI companies.

By Lila Shroff



<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2024/10/chatbot-transcript-data-advertising/680112/>

## Privacy: LLM interactions = gold mine

- For API interactions → you leak your processes
- Using it for coding (co-pilot)? → better use it only on open source.
- For personal (web) interactions: you leak *detailed and hour long* personal conversations on
  - Relationships & breakups
  - Illnesses (or suspected ones)
  - Mental health
  - Your deepest sexual desires (think: AI boyfriend/girlfriend)
  - Etc.
- This data is too juicy for advertisement to ignore.
- **Enshittification** of the AI hype will follow (3 stages: good to for users, good for biz, good for itself only)

Enshittification: Cory Doctorow, <https://www.ft.com/content/6fb1602d-a08b-4a8c-bac0-047b7d64aba5>

➔ We need local models!

But: can a local model do this just as well?

Local models FTW! ... let's see...

Hardware?

## Inference only or also fine-tuning?

- Inference:
  - Model size matters
  - Needs / should fit into VRAM
  - Sweet spot currently: Mac Studio M3 Ultra / M4
  - More (shared) RAM == better
  - More Bandwidth == better
- Consumer grade?
- Mac Laptops for smaller models
- RTX 4090/5090 + CUDA
- Will it run?
  - <https://apxml.com>



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- Will it run?
  - <https://apxml.com>

Apple M4 MAX	Apple M3 ULTRA
Up to 16-core CPU	Up to 32-core CPU
Up to 40-core GPU	Up to 80-core GPU
Up to 128GB unified memory	Up to 512GB unified memory
Up to 546GB/s memory bandwidth	819GB/s memory bandwidth
16-core Neural Engine	32-core Neural Engine

## Discussion round

- Your experiences with running (inference) local models?
- Questions?

## Fine-tuning?

- Remember: the bitter lesson + data availability
- If you have a bigger model (qwen32b, 120b, kimi-k2, ..) you will need lots of data to compete against the base-training
- Fine-tuning:
  - In general: NVIDIA GPUs (A100, H200, ...)
  - But also works with Mac MLX! Ping me for HOWTO (thx Alex, CERT-EU)
  - I have no experience with AMD
  - Important: working CUDA libs!
  - Tipp: lambdalabs stack on Ubuntu

## Lambdalabs Stack (Ubuntu)

- <https://lambda.ai/lambda-stack-deep-learning-software>


```
wget -nv -O- https://lambda.ai/install-lambda-stack.sh |  
I_AGREE_TO_THE_CUDNN_LICENSE=1 sh -
```

## Training

- pre-training → can we have a super-computer plz? (openai). **NO**
- continuous pre-training → same, just a continuous basis. **NO**
- Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) . **Yes**
- fine-tuning / adapters (LoRA). **Yes**

## How to do fine tuned, local models?

- Use a good, open base foundational LLM: mixtral, mistral, Llama-2, Llama-3
- But can we do it? Are they as good?
- Can we train them on our data?
- Do we need a datacenter of GPUs?
- No!
  - Use a solid base-model
  - Add a LoRA model “on top”



## Datasets, benchmarking

the need for high quality data for training and benchmarking

## Problems with datasets

- No clear standardized taxonomy of NER categories
- Data is messy, hard to train on
- Text from orkl.eu is not very useable as-is. PDFs are the master source  
PDF2text is a hard problem
- No standard benchmark dataset for CTI LLMs

## Running a local model

- Ollama
- Vllm
- LMStudio (Mac)
- huggingface

Demo LMStudio


Demo ollama

## Demo openweb-ui

## Where to get open weights models?

- Huggingface
- Ollama.com
- Read the model cards
- Will it run? <https://apxml.com/models>

# Will it run?



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `apxml.com/tools/vram-calculator`. The page title is "LLM Inference: VRAM & Performance Calculator". The interface is split into two main sections: configuration on the left and results on the right.

**Configuration Section:**

- Inference** (selected tab) / Fine-tuning
- Select Model:** DeepSeek-R1 70B
- Inference Quantization:** Q4KM (Precision for model weights during inference. Lower uses less VRAM but may affect quality.)
- KV Cache Quantization:** INT8 (KV Cache precision. Lower values reduce VRAM, especially for long sequences.)
- Hardware Configuration:** RTX 4090 (24GB)
- Num GPUs:** 3 (Devices for parallel inference)
- GPU Interconnect Type:** PCIe 5.0 x16 (128 GB/s) (Scaling factor: 0.88. Connection type between GPUs. Higher bandwidth enables better scaling efficiency.)

**Performance & Memory Results Section:**

- VRAM Usage:** 63.1% (indicated by a green circular progress bar)
- Performance Level:** MODERATE
- VRAM Requirement:** 45.43 GB (of 72 GB VRAM (3 x 24 GB GPUs))
- Generation Speed:** ~164 tok/sec (~6.1 ms/token latency)
- Time to First Token:** ~86ms
- Total Throughput:** ~164 tok/sec

Demo apxml.com

# Training a local LLM

Example CTI.tools

## Our approach: LoRA on orkl.eu

- Orkl.eu - ~ 10k CTI reports, slides, etc.
- Problem: PDFs to text
- We used 10k reports
- → train with it
  
- But which base model?
  
- Side-note: future approach: RL (like DeepSeek-R1)

# Example: CTI reports - related research & existing datasets

The screenshot shows the ORKL Threat Actor Profile for APT29. The profile includes the following fields:

ID	20d3a08a-3b97-4b2f-90b8-92a89089a57a
Main Name	APT29
Source	MITRE
Source Name	MITRE:APT29
Aliases/Synonyms	APT29 IRON RITUAL IRON HEMLOCK NobleBaron Dark Halo StellarParticle NOBELIUM UNC2452 YTTRIUM The Dukes Cozy Bear CozyDuke SolarStorm Blue Kitsune UNC3524

Annotations on the right side of the screenshot:


- 13000 reports
- Mixed quality
- Converted from PDF
- Shout-out do Robert Haist!
- Thanks!

Demo orkl.eu dataset

## Mistral AI

- <https://mistral.ai>
- <https://github.com/mistralai/mistral-finetune/tree/main>
- Particularly interesting: MiXtral (MoE) model: 8x22b = 176b params
- But that needs more GPU power than I have
- Trained on 3 x RTX 4090 (@home)
- Mistral 7B to start with

The graph shows performance (COMET score) for translation. We use this as estimate for general language skills. Choose another benchmark if applicable to your use-case



## Training text

Raw (pre-training): → 122M tokens on 10k orkl.eu texts

```
{"text": "Text contained in document n°1"}
{"text": "Text contained in document n°2"}
```

Instruct fine-tuning:

```
{
  "messages": [
    {
      "role": "user",
      "content": "User interaction n°1 contained in document n°1"
    },
    {
      "role": "assistant",
      "content": "Bot interaction n°1 contained in document n°1"
    },
    {
      "role": "user",
      "content": "User interaction n°2 contained in document n°1"
    }
  ]
}
```

## Training text

Raw (pre-training): → 122M tokens on 10k orkl.eu texts


```
{"text": "Text contained in document n°1"}
```

```
{"text": "Text contained in document n°2"}
```

Instruct fine-tuning:

```
cd $HOME/mistral-finetune
torchrun --nproc-per-node 8 --master_port $RANDOM -m train example/7B.yaml
```

```
{
  {
    "role": "assistant",
    "content": "Bot interaction n°1 contained in document n°1"
  },
  {
    "role": "user",
    "content": "User interaction n°2 contained in document n°1"
  }
}
```



## Demo w&b

<https://wandb.ai/>

## Status quo & Implications


- Works very well with Mistral 7B
- Next step: scale up to Mistral 70B (GPUs anyone?)
- And then MiXtral 8x22B, DeepSeek-R1
- Evaluate against the CTITools benchmark

# Integration into MISP

## Objectives


- Want to have a **generic and standardized RESTful API interface** so that
  - We can talk with a local LLM
  - ... also with a remote LLM (openAI, openAI vs. Azure, Anthropic (Claude), ...)
- Enforcing a consistent answer format (JSON)
  - Example: unstructured info into LLM → JSON out
- **Ensuring the analyst flow** in the MISP platform and integration with the MISP event reports format

# First integration with MISP



# Send the report to the LLM

The screenshot shows the MISP web interface. The main content is an event report titled 'apt29 bleeping computer'. The report text includes details about Russian APT29 hackers' stealthy malware and mentions of Cozy Bear, The Dukes, and Yttrium. A context menu is open over the text, with the 'LLM' option selected. The menu also includes options for 'Download', 'Markdown parsing rules', 'Markdown rendering rules', and 'Extract entities'. The interface also shows navigation links like 'Home', 'Event Actions', 'Dashboard', and 'API'.



# Voila! Context and tags

**test event 2**

Event ID	193386
UUID	630c3706-69f9-403e-a518-d98ac448b7f6
Creator org	lo-res.org
Owner org	lo-res.org
Creator user	admin@admin.test
Protected Event (experimental)	Event is in unprotected mode. <a href="#">Switch to protected mode</a>
Tags	<code>misp-galaxy:threat-actor="Sofacy, Zebrocy"</code> <code>misp-galaxy:threat-actor-country="unknown"</code> <code>misp-galaxy:threat-actor-motivation="Espionage"</code>
Date	2023-11-02
Threat Level	High
Analysis	Initial
Distribution	Your organisation only
Warnings	<b>Content:</b> Your event has neither attributes nor objects, whilst this can have legitimate reasons (such as purely creating an event with an event report or galaxy clusters), in most cases it's a sign that the event has yet to be fleshed out.
Published	No

# Demo session – training a local model

The screenshot shows the vast.ai website interface. The top navigation bar includes 'vast.ai', 'Docs', 'Clusters', 'FAQ', 'Hosting', 'Blog', and 'Contact'. A search bar is visible with the URL 'cloud.vast.ai'. The main content area displays a search for GPU instances with filters for '#GPUs: ANY', 'On-Demand', '20 GPUs', 'Planet Earth', and 'Price (inc.)'. A sidebar on the left contains navigation options like 'Search', 'Templates', 'Instances', 'Storage', 'Serverless', 'Account', 'Billing', 'Earnings', 'Members', 'Audit Logs', 'Keys', and 'Settings'. The main area shows a 'No template selected' message with a 'Select Template' button. Below this, there are 'Filter Options' including 'Show Secure Cloud Only' and an 'Availability' slider set to 90.00%. The instance list includes:

ID	Host	Region	GPU	Series	Network	Ports	Perf	Reliability	Price
m:26600	host:32241	Minnesota, US	2x A10	KMPG-U8 Series	↑862 Mbps ↓768 Mbps	499 ports	57.7 DLPerf	99.90%	\$0.344/hr
m:37444	host:209278	The Netherlands, NL	2x A10	06V45N	↑1763 Mbps ↓906 Mbps	499 ports	58.2 DLPerf	99.913%	\$0.369/hr
m:30582	host:137006	British Columbia, CA	2x A40	MG51-G21-00	↑760 Mbps ↓752 Mbps	999 ports	20.6 DLPerf	99.947%	\$0.836/hr
m:19433	host:61938	Croatia, HR	2x A40	X12DPG-OA6	↑933 Mbps ↓939 Mbps	39 ports	85.8 DLPerf	99.33%	\$0.851/hr

## Axolotl

- <https://axolotl.ai/>

## Evaluating a local model

- Benchmarks, benchmarks, benchmarks
- Also, human eval makes sense


## Recap

- Exciting new field
- Next time, slides need to be re-done again, so much changes
- Progress is fast, we sometimes already exceed humans in specific tasks
- AI has no 'I' in 'AI'
- But, we humans are often not 'I' either 😊
- Attackers currently have an advantage
- Philosophical implications: job market (pentesters?), geopolitics? EU as a soft target? Where are the AI gems in Europe? The data centers?

## Trends

- Essentially, he is saying:  
“we we will try to emphasize defense, but... there will be lots of models”
- Open weights models can also be (mis-) used
- Pandora’s box is open
- oligarchy of model-providers vs. decentralized lethality?

<https://x.com/sama/status/2014733975755817267>



Danke  
Es bleibt spannend

[aaron@lo-res.org](mailto:aaron@lo-res.org)